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SURVEY SECTION
Criminal Procedure. State v. DiStefano, 764 A.2d 1156 (R.I.
2000). Rhode Island statutory law precludes admission of results
of chemical tests at trial when the samples were seized without an
individual's consent after the individual operated a motor vehicle
within the state and was arrested. When such an individual has
refused a chemical test, no test should be given, with or without a
search warrant. Such preclusion is not an unconstitutional limita-
tion on the judicial authority to issue search warrants because the
superior court's warrant authority is limited to those powers con-
ferred by statute from the Legislature and under these circum-
stances, no warrant authority has been delineated.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The defendant, Lisa A. DiStefano (DiStefano), was driving a
motor vehicle on Post Road in Warwick, Rhode Island, and collided
with a motorcycle driven by David Smith.1 Mr. Smith died from
the injuries he sustained in the accident. 2 After an on-scene inves-
tigation, DiStefano was arrested for suspicion of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 3 While at the
Warwick police station, DiStefano submitted to a breath test and
tested below the legal limit for alcohol intoxication.4 A drug influ-
ence evaluation was then performed on DiStefano by an expert in
the field, who concluded that she was under the influence of a cen-
tral nervous system stimulant.5 DiStefano was asked to submit to
a blood test to determine the presence or absence of controlled sub-
stances, but she refused.6 The Warwick police then obtained a
search warrant from a superior court justice to extract blood and
urine samples from DiStefano.7 The blood test, obtained at a
nearby hospital, showed the presence of marijuana and cocaine.,
As a result, DiStefano was charged with one count of driving under
the influence of liquor or drugs (DUI), death resulting, in violation
1. See State v. DiStefano, 764 A.2d 1156, 1157 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 1157-58.
6. See id. at 1158.
7. See id.
8. See id.
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of section 31-27-2.2, 9 as well as various counts of possession of a
controlled substance.10
Prior to trial, DiStefano filed a motion to suppress the intro-
duction of the test results." She contended that because her blood
was drawn without her consent, in violation of section 31-27-2(c), 12
the test results were inadmissible, even though a judicially-author-
ized search warrant was obtained by police.13 The superior court
stayed further proceedings until three certified questions of law
could be answered by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 14 First, in
view of State v. Timms,15 should section 31-27-2(c) be interpreted
to preclude, in a case involving an alleged violation of section 31-
27-2.2 (driving under the influence, death resulting), the admis-
sion at trial of results of breathalyzer, blood or urine tests when
the samples were seized without DiStefano's consent after a judi-
cially authorized search warrant was issued? Secondly, does the
language of section 31-27-2.1 (the breathalyzer refusal statute)
preclude officers from obtaining a judicially authorized search war-
rant to seize a defendant's blood for alcohol or drug testing? Third,
if the answer to the second question is yes, is the breathalyzer re-
fusal statute an unconstitutional limit on the judicial authority to
issue search warrants as provided in Article 5 of the Rhode Island
Constitution and Rhode Island General Laws section 12-5-1?16
9. See id.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.2 (1956) (2000 Reenactment). This stat-
ute generally provides the elements of "driving under the influence of liquor or
drugs, resulting in death," and mandates that upon conviction, a violator is to be
punished by imprisonment for no less than five (5) years if a first time offender of
this violation. See DiStefano, 764 A.2d at 1159 n.4.
10. See DiStefano, 764 A.2d at 1158.
11. See id.
12. See id.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2(c) (1956) (2000 Reenactment). This stat-
ute generally provides that in a criminal prosecution for a violation of subsection
(a) of this section, evidence as to the amount of liquor, toluene, or any controlled
substance in the defendant's blood at the time alleged as shown by a chemical
analysis from a bodily substance test shall be admissible and competent provided
that, among several conditions, the defendant has consented to the taking of the
test. See DiStefano, 764 A.2d at 1159 n.5.
13. See DiStefano, 764 A.2d at 1158.
14. See id.
15. 505 A.2d 1132 (R.I. 1986).
16. See DiStefano, 764 A.2d at 1158; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-5-1 (1956) (2000 Re-
enactment). This statute provides that a search warrant may be issued by any
judge of the district court and that nothing contained in this chapter shall be con-
strued as to restrain the power of the justices of the supreme or superior courts by
virtue of § 8-3-6 to issue a search warrant. The authority for issuance of a search
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ANALysis AND HOLDING
In a plurality decision, the supreme court reviewed prior case
law and methods of statutory construction to answer the first two
certified questions in the affirmative. 17 Because both questions
were dependent on statutory interpretation, the court reviewed the
historical treatment of statutes involving drunk driving.' 8 Previ-
ously, as greater awareness of the inherent dangers of drunk driv-
ing emerged, the Legislature enacted statutes detailing various
misdemeanor and felony charges for such violations. 19 In cases of
the misdemeanor offense of driving under the influence, section 31-
27-2(a), the Legislature provided that evidence from a chemical
analysis of the defendant's blood, breath or urine is inadmissible
unless the defendant has consented to the test.2 0 This consent re-
quirement that was explicitly included in reference to misde-
meanor prosecutions was never explicitly worded in reference to
the felony DUI prosecutions enacted at a later date.2 ' The felony
statute at issue in the present case, section 31-27-2.2, driving
under the influence of liquor or drugs, death resulting, clearly de-
fines the crime and prescribes the punishment, but never sets forth
the methods of proof to be used in determining whether the crime
was committed.22 In light of this statutory reality, the supreme
court first faced the question of whether the Legislature intended
to exclude nonconsensual test results in DUI felony cases by explic-
itly including the consent requirement for misdemeanor prosecu-
tions and implicitly including the requirement in felony
prosecutions. 23
In determining that the Legislature did intend to exclude non-
consensual test results in DUI felony cases, the supreme court
partly relied on the case of State v. Timms 24 in which the statutory
warrant is found in § 12-5-2, which provides that a warrant may be issued under
this chapter to search for and seize any property falling into one of four distinct
categories. One such category is property, which is evidence of the commission of a
crime. See DiStefano, 764 A.2d at 1166-67.
17. See DiStefano, 764 A.2d at 1157-66.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 1159.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 1160.
23. See id. at 1161.
24. 505 A.2d 1132 (R.I. 1986).
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construction concept of in pari material was espoused.25 While a
strong dissent in the present case distinguished the Timms case,
arguing irreconcilable factual and policy differences and ultimately
overruling the holding by a three to two decision, the majority
found that, like in Timms, statutes that relate to the same subject
matter should be construed together for consistency and proper ef-
fectuation of the law.26 Timms was a case involving the public
safety felony charge section 31-27-1 entitled "Driving so as to en-
danger, resulting in death."27 The court in that decision consid-
ered whether the actual consent requirement in section 31-27-2
applied, or whether a written consent form was required under the
Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act.28
While the court in Timms noted that the Legislature never ex-
plicitly required consent from the defendant prior to taking a blood
test and using it as evidence in a criminal prosecution, it was held
that the Legislature must have intended section 31-27-1 to include
the consent safeguards provided in section 31-27-2, since both stat-
utes concerned the same subject matter.29 Therefore in the case at
hand, just as in Timms, the supreme court ruled itself duty bound
to effectuate the intent of the Legislature by requiring the consent
requirement in section 31-27-2(c) to apply not only to its explicit
counterpart of section 31-27-2(a), but also to section 31-27-2.2, a
statute so related in subject matter, driving in a manner which
threatens public safety, to be similarly situated and similarly sub-
ject to the consent requirement. 30 This holding was consistent
with the supreme court's recent past findings that similar statutes
should be interpreted similarly.3 ' Additionally, the court deemed
the language found in the consent statute to be clear and unambig-
uous, thereby leaving no room for statutory interpretation or ad-
ded meaning to comport with the court's idea of justice, expediency
or sound public policy.32
The supreme court interpreted the breathalyzer refusal stat-
ute, section 31-27-2.1, as it relates to DUI cases before answering
25. See DiStefano, 764 A.2d at 1159.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 1159-60.
31. See id. at 1160 (citing State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251 (R.I. 1998)).
32. See id. at 1161.
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the first two certified questions in the affirmative. 33 This statute
relates to any person who operates a motor vehicle in the state and
provides that if a person who has been arrested refuses to submit
to a chemical test upon request by an officer, "none shall be
given."3 4 For the first time, the court was in a position to interpret
what type of offenses the phrase "none shall be given" actually ap-
plies to.3 5 The court noted that while the test refusal statute had
been interpreted previously regarding the issue of implied consent
and its applicability in license revocation proceedings, 36 never
before had the court held that the mandate "none shall be given"
was inapplicable in DUI cases, felony or misdemeanor. 37 The su-
preme court acknowledged that refusal and DUI are two separate
offenses, and that there are distinct penalties for refusal. Addi-
tionally, the court noted that despite refusal, one may still be
charged and convicted of DUI based upon evidence other than the
results of a chemical test, such as the appearance of intoxication.38
Yet while distinct offenses, the refusal statute speaks to offenses
that include DUI. 39 Specifically in section 31-27-2.1(a), the lan-
guage is clear that there is a presumption of implied consent for
anyone operating a motor vehicle in the state, including those ar-
rested for all types of DUI offenses, and that upon refusal to sub-
mit to a chemical test, no test shall be given.40 Because the
language is unambiguous, the statute clearly becomes operative
with or without a warrant.4 1 No authority is given to force an indi-
vidual in this situation to submit to a test, whether suspected of a
felony or a misdemeanor DUI. 4
2
The court interprets the refusal statute as having broader ap-
plicability than merely dictating whether a driver may be charged
with refusal.4 3 By affording protection to all suspects, the court
acknowledged the risks that the lack of policy and procedure cur-
rently established by the police department or the Attorney Gen-
33. See id. at 1161-63.
34. See id. at 1161.
35. See id. at 1161-63.
36. See id. at 1162 (citing State v. Berker, 391 A.2d 107 (R.I. 1978)).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1162-63 (citing DiCicco, 707 A.2d at 255).
39. See id. at 1162.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 1163.
42. See id.
43. See id.
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eral could have on a person forced to submit to testing." When
faced with a resistant driver, a hospital technician could be liable
for assault or malpractice. Without proper standards for handling
potentially volatile situations, the court preferred to eliminate the
need for forced testing until such standards are properly legislated
by the General Assembly.45 Additionally, in interpreting legisla-
tive intent behind the implied consent and refusal statute, the
court could find no reason for a scheme that affords a driver ac-
cused of a misdemeanor greater protections than a driver accused
of a more serious felony offense. 46 Accordingly, the court admon-
ished any and all testing of a driver without actual consent after
operation of a vehicle and arrest for either a misdemeanor or felony
offense. 47
In addition to requiring consent before taking a chemical test
based on public policy,48 the supreme court held that there can be
no valid judicially authorized search warrant for the seizure of bod-
ily fluids when there is no statutory authorization for its issu-
ance. 49 The court conducted an extensive review of other states'
procedures, discovering that in the majority of states that admit
evidence from a test taken without compliance with the implied
consent procedures, there exists a statute that requires or permits
the withdrawal of blood in felony DUI cases. 50 State courts having
earlier encountered questions similar to those presented to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court were found to have barred the forci-
ble seizure of blood and admissibility of test results without a clear
and explicit statutory exception.5 ' In reaction to these judicial de-
cisions, numerous legislatures passed exceptions to the prohibition
of admitting test results taken after refusal.5 2 These exception
statutes generally allow use of evidence and forcible seizure of
blood in DUI cases when there has been a death or serious injury
resulting.53 Some states have further amended statutes to detail
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 1162.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 1163 (citing State v, Locke, 418 A.2d 843 (R.I. 1980)).
49. See id.
50. See id. at 1164-66.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 1166.
53. See id.
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procedures for forced testing and to provide immunity from liabil-
ity for medical personnel who perform the tests.5 4 Several states
would not recognize the authority of a search warrant as a means
of getting around the statutory prohibition (of giving a test upon a
refusal) when no statute has given specific judicial authority to
override the protections afforded an accused.56 In New Mexico, for
example, after finding no exception for a search for a driver's blood
alcohol content without driver consent, the court invited the New
Mexico Legislature to write an exception into the law to allow for
the issuance of a chemical test search warrant.56 The Legislature
promptly responded, and New Mexico's present refusal statute
contains an exception which allows for a chemical test search war-
rant when there is probable cause to believe a person was driving
under the influence and caused death or great bodily injury.57 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court, when faced with similar shortcom-
ings of its implied consent statute, determined that no chemical
test should be given without consent, regardless of whether a
search warrant has been issued. 58 Such will be the law until the
Rhode Island Legislature crafts exceptions to the rule and grants
authority for search warrants. 59 The court was careful not to tread
upon the separation of powers inherent in the legal system and
was unwilling to allow exceptions where none were authorized.
The supreme court answered the third certified question in the
negative. 60 After holding that officers may not obtain a search
warrant even when the driver is suspected of a felony DUI with
death resulting, the court held that this decision is not an uncon-
stitutional limitation of the judicial authority to issue search war-
rants.61 Being statutory in origin, the superior court has no
inherent powers to issue a search warrant, but may only exercise
those powers conferred by statute.62 Under section 12-5-2, 63 there
54. See id.
55. See id. at 1164-65.
56. See id. at 1165 (citing State v. Steele, 601 P.2d 440, 441 (N.M. Ct. App.
1979)).
57. See id.; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-111 (Michie 1998).
58. See id. at 1166.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 1166-70.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 1167-68.
63. See id. at 1166-67. This statute speaks to the issuance of a warrant by any
judge of the district court, however, R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-3-6 (1956) gives supreme
2001] 709
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are four enumerated circumstances in which recognized classes of
property may be searched for and properly seized by warrant.64 Of
the four, the only class of property remotely related to DUI evi-
dence is property that is "evidence of the commission of a crime."65
However, more convincing was the lack of authority in any other
Rhode Island statutes to issue a search warrant for the withdrawal
and seizure of blood or other bodily fluids.66 The General Assem-
bly has extended the scope of judicial warrant authority for specific
instances ranging from searches of gambling paraphernalia, to lo-
cations connected to animal cruelty, and seizure of obscene mate-
rial, to driver's licenses under wrongful possession.67 The
Legislature had never explicitly authorized the search and seizure
of a person's bodily fluids.68 This view is in keeping with the spirit
of the Rhode Island Constitution. Article 1, section 6, deals with
search warrants only in the negative sense.6 9 It emphasizes the
strong rights of people to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures and limits the scope of a warrant generally.70 Conse-
quently, the court chose to err on the side of caution and compli-
ance in limiting the scope of judicial authority to search and seize a
person's bodily fluids.
Lastly, while recognizing the Schmerber v. California7l deci-
sion as good federal law, the court found Rhode Island law and pol-
icy to be more determinative of the present situation.7 2 Under
Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court decided the lengths
a state might go without violating the Federal Constitution. 73 The
Schmerber court held that a warrant requirement was precluded
by the necessity to secure evidence before it is compromised by the
passage of time and that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-
alcohol content in that case was not violative of the Fourth or Four-
and superior court justices the same power in criminal cases that the district
courts have.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 1167.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 1168.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 1167.
70. See id.
71. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
72. See DiStefano, 764 A.2d at 1169.
73. See id.
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teenth Amendment despite the defendant's objection. 74 However,
Schmerber did not address whether the law in California would
have allowed a warrant in the first place. 75 In light of the strong
public policy against allowing forced testing without defined proce-
dures, and in light of Rhode Island's deliberate consent require-
ments and lack of specific statutory authority to issue a warrant to
obtain test results, the supreme court believed that a balance must
be properly struck. 76 Such a balance was found to exist in the
Timms decision, and the majority refused to overrule that decision
at the risk of treading on legislative ground.77 The dissent held a
different view of Timms, and ultimately did reverse it.78
The Concurrence
The Chief Justice, in concurring with the majority opinion, la-
mented that the Legislature had not been more explicit in its stat-
utory directives, as he recognized that whether in the majority or
dissent, all agree with the public policy that persons deliberately
driving while impaired should not be immune from punishment
when contributing to so great a source of human suffering and
demise.79
The Dissent
Justice Flanders concurred with the court's affirmative an-
swers to questions two (in part) and three, but joined a strong dis-
sent by Justices Bourcier and Lederberg as to question one.80 The
dissent answered questions one and two in the negative; subse-
quently, question three was a moot issue.8 ' The dissent found er-
ror with the court's reliance on Timms, believing that case to
contain misguided dicta relating to a case far removed factually
from the issues of consent in the present case. 82 The dissent
opined that the Timms court failed to appreciate that the purpose
behind driver testing is to facilitate conviction and not to grant im-
74. See id. at 1168.
75. See id. at 1169.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1175.
79. See id. at 1170-71.
80. See id. at 1170-71.
81. See id. at 1174.
82. See id. at 1174-75.
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munity from prosecution and conviction.83 The Legislature's in-
tent, by unambiguously drafting the section 31-27-2(c) consent
requirement in reference to misdemeanors and not felonies, was to
grant protection to the multitude of minor offenders from invasive,
forceful testing procedures.8 4
Historically, the felony statutes were not in contemplation by
the Legislature until years later, and therefore the consent re-
quirement was not intentionally applicable to felony offenses.8 5
The Legislature could not have intended the same protections to
suspected felons, in light of the growing awareness of the evils in-
herent in the injuries and deaths resulting from impaired driv-
ers.8 6 Under the misdemeanor offenses, the penalty for refusal to
consent carries with it a small fine and a short license suspen-
sion.8 7 The dissent found no logic in the majority's holding that
the Legislature intended a potential felon to suffer the same small
penalty upon refusal, meanwhile avoiding the five (5) to fifteen (15)
year sentence that he or she faces with a felony conviction.18
The dissent interpreted the DUI felony statute as clear on its
face and as not preclusive of testing and use of test results at trial
when consent is withheld because no explicit mention is made of
such a condition precedent.8 9 Similarly, the majority interpreted
the same statute as clear on its face, but found the lack of explicit
authority to be prohibitive of forced testing or of warrant
authority. 90
CONCLUSION
The admission of results of a breathalyzer, blood or urine tests
at trial for a felony violation of driving under the influence, death
resulting, was precluded when samples were seized without the
defendant's consent. The language in the implied consent statute,
relating to violations in the operation of a vehicle, is clear and un-
ambiguous, stating that no test shall be given to any suspect upon
arrest after operating a motor vehicle in the state. The supreme
83. See id. at 1175.
84. See id. at 1181.
85. See id. at 1182-83.
86. See id. at 1183.
87. See id. at 1183-84.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 1185.
90. See id. at 1186.
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court interpreted the consent requirement as applicable not only to
misdemeanor suspects, but also to felony suspects. The superior
court has no authority to issue a search warrant for one's bodily
fluids because the Rhode Island Legislature has not specifically
granted such authority. Consequently, a search warrant that or-
ders an individual to submit to chemical testing despite refusal
holds no power. Such limitations on the judicial authority to issue
search warrants is not unconstitutional.
Christy Hetherington
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Criminal Procedure. State v. Ferrara, 748 A.2d 246 (R.I. 2000).
When a trial court fails to act on a defendant's timely motion to
reduce his sentence by reason of the court's own error, any ensuing
delay cannot as a matter of law be an unreasonable delay barring
relief under Rhode Island Superior Court Criminal Procedure Rule
35.
In State v. Ferrara, I the Rhode Island Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a seven-year delay in a trial court's ruling on a
timely filed motion to reduce sentence divested the court of juris-
diction to hear the motion, thus, barring relief pursuant to the
Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule
35.2 In Ferrara, the court determined that the trial court's failure
to timely address a Rule 35 motion due to its own error or inaction,
does not violate the reasonable time requirement of Rule 35 and
divest jurisdiction over the matter.3 The court asserted that a pris-
oner who properly files a Rule 35 motion should not be penalized
unfairly because of circumstances beyond his or her control. 4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On or about March 22, 1988, the Rhode Island Superior Court
sentenced Matthew Ferrara (Ferrara) for various criminal convic-
tions including kidnapping, robbery and rape.5 On March 7, 1990,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court denied and dismissed Ferrara's
appeal and affirmed the convictions for all offenses.6 Subse-
quently, on or about May 17, 1990, Ferrara filed a timely pro se
motion to reduce his sentence. 7 On or about May 21, 1990, Ferrara
also filed a motion to appoint counsel and a motion to assign a de-
termination of attorney hearing.8 The Rhode Island Superior
Court did not respond to any of these motions. 9
On November 19, 1997, approximately seven and one-half
years from the date Ferrara filed the motion to reduce his sen-
tence, the state filed an objection to this motion arguing that the
1. 748 A.2d 246 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 249.
4. See id. at 248.
5. See id. at 246.
6. See id. at 247.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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trial court no longer had jurisdiction to hear the matter.10 The
state asserted that Rule 35 of the Rhode Island Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the trial court to retain juris-
diction on such a matter only for a reasonable time after the expira-
tion of the 120-day jurisdictional requirement."
The state asserted that the seven-year delay in addressing
Ferrara's motion was per se unreasonable and, therefore, violated
the requirements of Rule 35.12 The state further contended that a
hearing on Ferrara's motion would unfairly prejudice the state and
illegally impede the parole board's executive function.13
The trial justice sustained the objection, finding that the
seven-year delay was unreasonable and thus divested the trial
court of its jurisdiction to hear the motion.14 Ferrara appealed this
decision to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.15
BACKGROUND
Rule 35 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that a motion to reduce sentence be filed within
120 days after the sentence is imposed. 16 The motion to reduce
sentence permits a trial justice to evaluate whether a sentence is
excessive and to consider any new information that may arise
within the 120-day time period.' 7 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court has interpreted the 120-day period to be a jurisdictional re-
quirement.' 8 Thus, in order to properly file a Rule 35 motion, a
prisoner must do so within this time period.
Rule 35 also mandates that the trial court address the motion
within a reasonable time after such motion is filed. 19 However, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has taken the position that the fail-
ure of a trial judge to rule on the motion within the 120-day period
10. See id. at 248.
11. See id.; Garcia v. United States, 542 A.2d 1237, 1238 (D.C. App. 1988)
(Rule 35 provides, in relevant part: "Reduction of Sentence. The Court shall deter-
mine the motion [to reduce a sentence] within a reasonable time").
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 (1999).
17. See Ferrara, 748 A.2d at 248. (citing State v. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d 1328,
1331 (R.I. 1983)).
18. See id. (citing State v. Letourneau, 446 A.2d 746, 748 (R.I. 1982)).
19. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 (1999).
2001] 715
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does not terminate the jurisdiction of the court.20 The court has
asserted that only the time in which to file the motion, not the time
in which a ruling must be made should be considered for jurisdic-
tional purposes. 21
ANALYSis AND HOLDING
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first noted that
Ferrara's motion to reduce sentence was timely filed within the
120 day period pursuant to Rule 35.22 The court then posited the
issue in the case: "did the seven year delay in ruling on the motion
divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the matter?"23 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial court's delay in
ruling on the motion did not terminate jurisdiction, and that the
matter should be remanded for a determination on the merits.24
The supreme court held as a matter of law, when a trial court
fails to act on a defendant's timely Rule 35 motion by reason of the
court's own error, any resulting delay is not an unreasonable delay
divesting jurisdiction and precluding relief under Rule 35.25 The
supreme court further stated that the trial court should favor a
liberal reading of the reasonable time requirement pursuant to
Rule 35.26 A prisoner who properly files a Rule 35 motion should
not be penalized because of circumstances beyond his or her
control. 2
7
In the present case, Ferrara timely filed his motion to reduce
sentence, followed several days later by a motion to appoint coun-
sel so that he could be represented in the matter.2 As such, the
supreme court held that the trial justice had abused his discretion
in finding that the trial court's own failure in timely addressing
Ferrara's motion terminated that court's jurisdiction and barred
20. See Ferrara, 748 A.2d at 248; Letourneau, 446 A.2d at 747-48.
21. See id. (citing Garcia, 542 A.2d at 1241 (quoting United States v. House,
808 F.2d 508, 509 (7th Cir. 1986)).
22. See Ferrara, 748 A.2d at 248.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 249
25. See id. at 248 (citing Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 239, 250 (3rd. Cir.
1984) (Gibbons, J., dissenting)).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 248-49.
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relief under Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, Rule 35.29
CONCLUSION
In State v. Ferrara, the Rhode Island Supreme Court deter-
mined that a trial court's jurisdiction to hear a Rule 35 motion
could not be terminated by the trial court's own inaction on the
matter. The court stated that a prisoner who files a timely Rule 35
motion shall not be denied relief due to circumstances beyond his
control, and that the trial court should favor a liberal reading of
the reasonable time requirement included in Rule 35.
Patricia K. Holmes
29. See id. at 249.
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